The Protocol provided for:. On 27 September, the United States called on the USSR to join it in taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes without undermining the credibility of existing deterrent forces. In April, the United States proposed an executive agreement, not tied to the ABM Treaty, that included the exchange of data on defensive programs, meetings of experts, briefings, visits to laboratories, observations of tests, and notifications of ABM tests.
The Soviet Union also agreed to eliminate its radar near Krasnoyarsk without preconditions. On March, the United States presented the Soviet side with a new initiative that would permit the development, testing, and deployment of space-based sensors without restriction.
From 24 to 31 August , the Parties conducted the third review of the Treaty. Unlike at the two previous reviews, the Parties were unable to issue a joint statement, but came forward with unilateral statements.
The United States demanded that the radar be dismantled and noted that the continuing existence of the Krasnoyarsk radar would make it impossible to conclude any future arms agreements in the START or defense and space areas.
The USSR accused the United States of adopting a confrontational and unobjective approach to the review and the situation around the radar in Krasnoyarsk, of reluctance in giving practical consideration to Soviet concerns, and of seeking to reduce the entire review of the operation of the ABM Treaty to the acceptance by the Soviet side of the American demand for the dismantling of the Kranoyarsk radar station, which arguably did not exist at the time of the review meeting.
The Soviet Union announced that in order to show goodwill, it expressed readiness to dismantle the equipment of this station in a way that would be verifiable, if an accord were reached on compliance with the ABM Treaty as was signed in It argued that US concerns over the USSR planning of a territorial defense was unfounded, and, in turn, raised the issue of US radar stations at Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, the United Kingdom, which it considered a violation of the Treaty as well as other alleged occasions of US noncompliance with the Treaty.
The United States also proposed that the Parties exchange data on their planned strategic defense activities on an annual basis, provide reciprocal briefings on their respective strategic defense efforts, permit visits to associated research facilities, and agree to procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.
During the October Reykjavik Summit, the Soviet side proposed that the Parties should commit not to withdraw from the Treaty within the year period. The USSR also proposed to ban testing of any space-based element of a missile defense system outside of laboratories, the proposal was rejected by the United States due to its potential impact on the SDI program.
During the March US-Soviet DST, the United States sought to discuss a transition from deterrence based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to increased reliance on defenses, either ground- or space-based, against ballistic missiles. The USSR in turn sought a comprehensive ban on research, development, testing, and deployment of space-based weapons.
However, the United States decided that the SDI program would be continued according to the more restrictive interpretation of the Treaty. He called for a research program, consistent with US obligations under the ABM Treaty, which would examine the feasibility of defensive measures against ballistic missiles to eliminate the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles and render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. In July, the United States revealed that it had detected the construction of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in the USSR, which it called an outright violation of the Treaty due to its location at about km from the nearest border, while the Treaty required that all such radars be located on the periphery of the country and were a key to providing a nationwide defense.
From 9 to 15 November, the Parties conducted the second review of the Treaty. A Party building a new test range would simply have to notify the other Party of its plans no later than 30 days after starting construction of ABM launchers or radars at a new site. With respect to air defense components, which are co-located with ABM components, the Parties agreed to refrain from concurrent testing of such air defense components and ABM system components at that range.
Following the Agreed Statement, the Parties exchanged statements, in which they specified the locations for phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment, and agreed that passage of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements through the fields of view of an EWR or a phased-array radar not operating the ABM mission, would not be equated with the tracking of such missiles by these radars and would not be grounded for either Party to consider that the radars are being tested in an ABM mode.
From 4 to 21 November, the Parties conducted a review of the Treaty after five years of its operation. They agreed that the Treaty had been operating effectively, that it had served the security interests of both Parties, decreased the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war, and facilitated progress in the further strategic offensive arms limitations. The Parties reaffirmed their mutual commitment to the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and their determination to maintain and further increase the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.
The Treaty also entitled the Parties to change the deployment site of the ABM system only once with advance notice. On the same day, the Parties adopted a document governing procedures for the dismantling, destruction, and notifications thereof for ABM systems and components.
Explore the Center. Close This page is no longer being updated. Category Missile Subcategory Bilateral. Ratified Withdrew See Status. Want to dive deeper? Signed 26 May Entered into Force 3 October Verification To ensure compliance with the Treaty, the parties were entitled to use their national technical means NTM of verification and were obligated not to interfere with such NTM and not to use deliberate concealment measures that impede such verification Article XII.
Proposed Amendments to the Treaty by the Clinton Administration The Protocol would allow the Parties to deploy a missile defense system for purposes of limited defense of their national territory against limited long-range ballistic missile strikes as an alternative to deploying the ABM systems permitted by Articles I and III of the Treaty Article I. The Parties acknowledged their right to establish and to deploy effective TMD systems without violating the Treaty and agreed that such a system: will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side; will not be tested to give such systems that capability; and will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.
Education Center Extensive resources on nuclear policy, biological threats, radiological security, cyber threats and more. National technical means NTM Satellites, aircraft, electronic, and seismic monitoring devices used to monitor the activities of other states, including treaty compliance and movement of troops and equipment.
Some agreements include measures that explicitly prohibit tampering with other parties' NTM. See entries for Transparency measures and Verification. Entry into force The moment at which all provisions of a treaty are legally binding on its parties. Every treaty specifies preconditions for its entry into force. For example, the NPT specified that it would enter into force after the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union the Depository governments and 40 other countries ratified the treaty, an event that occurred on March 5, See entries for Signature , Ratification.
In , U. Nevertheless, Nixon wanted to ensure a mutual U. As Kissinger would have known from reading the cable traffic, Brown preferred an ABM ban but if that could not be obtained, he wanted to prevent an ABM race by limiting the numbers of systems.
When Brown asked if Kissinger would consider a "2 population-sites deal", the latter was incensed because it implied that some at the SALT delegation "the sons of bitches" were interested in such an arrangement when they should be pushing for the current 2 to 1 proposal although Kissinger mistakenly said 3 to 1. Later in the conversation, Kissinger admitted that he had "no military rationale for the missile sites," but that it was necessary to stick with that position because 1 the administration had asked Congress for those sites, and 2 it would put pressure on the Soviets to negotiate.
Further, Kissinger wanted the Soviets to have only one site: he would not approve an agreement that allowed them any more.
Kissinger professed to be puzzled by his own actions: "I can't understand how it happened that we accepted NCA I often make mistakes but usually I know why afterward. Smith and Vladimir Semenov, developed an amiable working relationship and held many private discussions after the formal plenary sessions.
By this time, differences on the ABM issue were evident; one of the most persistent areas of disagreement concerned article II. Although Semenov elaborated at length about the implications of one word "indistinguishable" for verification, the Soviets may have been more worried that references to interceptors and the articles could somehow impinge on their freedom of action in upgrading surface-to-air missiles SAMs.
Smith, however, emphasized how important article II was for the U. Smith and the U. Document 21 U. Bracketed portions indicate which articles remained contested by one side or the other.
One of the most critically important disagreements was the matter of agreed ABM deployments. The U. Despite the disagreement on whether an article should explicitly address future systems, the two sides had reached, or were reaching, substantial agreement on a number of important points, including: 1 testing of ABM systems would be limited to "current" test ranges or those that were "additionally agreed. V 3 to bar development, testing, and deployment of multiple ABMs or automatic launchers Art.
V 4 not to provide non-ABM systems e. VI 5 to prevent ballistic missile early warning radars from playing ABM roles, in the future, such radars would only be deployed on the national periphery and "oriented outwards. XII 7 to use national means of verification and to bar interference with them Article XII 8 the arrangement would have "unlimited duration. The withdrawing party would have to explain what those "extraordinary events" were. XV Document 22 U. Document 23 U.
During this meeting, negotiator Aleksander N. Shchukin discussed some of the proposed key restrictions of an ABM agreement.
He showed that the Soviets accepted the idea of banning the development and deployment of mobile ABM systems as well as multiple ABMs and automatic reloading devices for them.
Nevertheless, he took issue with U. Such had never been done in a serious treaty. Instead, Schukin proposed that an ABM agreement explicitly "exclude the possibility of the defense of the territory of the country. Document 24 U. The delegation observed that the Soviets might have designed their Article I draft to counter U. The delegation would respond to the Soviets by asking for more specific proposals because "broad undertakings" were no substitute for them.
Document 25 Cable, Gerard C. Smith to Henry A. In this "roundup" prepared for the Kissinger back channel, he said that the Soviet proposal was "evidence" that Moscow accepted the "theory of mutual deterrence.
Document 26 U. Garthoff U. Usually, one of the U. Graham Parsons, also attended so that Garthoff could avoid possible charges of unauthorized action. Thus, this group came to be known as the "Group of Four.
This meeting shows that Article II, defining ABM systems and components, continued to be a difficult one; during a meeting of the "Group of Four", Grinevsky complained that it was "troublesome" and unnecessary. But he was willing to accept it if the U.
Garthoff responded that a trade was out because both II and V were important. Nevertheless, as he noted when preparing the memo, it appeared that the Soviets "would go through a ritual of trying to get concessions from our side on Article V before [Grinevsky] would be authorized to reach an agreement accepting the basic US position on Article II. As Aleksander Shchukin observed, if "new technology should make possible components carrying out the same tasks as existing components, but perhaps in a more efficient and less costly manner, why should those be prohibited?
Here could be found the seeds of an agreed statement that would supplement the treaty see document 34 below. As Spiers explained to Rogers and Irwin, the problem, of course, was how many and what kind of sites as well as limits on ABM radars so that excessive deployments would not allow a signatory to break out and establish an area defense. Document 29 U. Noting that there was no "connective" linking the descriptions of ABM systems and components, Grinevsky suggested adding "namely" or "consisting of" at the end of 1 a , but Garthoff proposed "currently consisting of" in the name of greater precision.
Russia said that it did not feel threatened by U. If a country develops an ABM system, an adversary could be incentivized to build more offensive weapons to overwhelm the defensive system. Both Parties agreed to limit qualitative improvement of their ABM technology, e. These provisions, the Agreed Statements clarify, also ban interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.
There had been some concern over the possibility that surface-to-air missiles SAMs intended for defense against aircraft might be improved, along with their supporting radars, to the point where they could effectively be used against ICBMs and SLBMs, and the Treaty prohibits this.
While further deployment of radars intended to give early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack is not prohibited, such radars must be located along the territorial boundaries of each country and oriented outward, so that they do not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior. Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and its unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along with mobile land-based ABM systems.
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